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Abstract 
Fiber-deployment of future telecommunications networks (“Next Generation Access” - NGA) is 
currently a major challenge for sector-specific regulators as well as for investing firms. Although the 
future socio-economic importance of new telecommunications networks is uncontroversial, the related 
investment activities vary substantially in international comparison.  
This work intends to identify the most important determinants of previous NGA deployment using 
data from the EU27 member states for the years 2005 to 2010. For our analysis, we employ latest data 
on NGA deployment, relevant competition and regulatory indicators as well as other supply and 
demand side controls. Our econometric model incorporates: i) aggregated country level data; ii) 
structurally modeled dynamics of the deployment process which allows us to disentangle long-term 
and short-term effects; finally, iii) we argue that there is no endogeneity problem with respect to 
investment activities and regulation since we refer to regulation in preceding broadband markets. For 
our econometric analysis, we employ several dynamic panel data methods, such as GMM and 
LSDVC.  
Our results indicate that stricter previous broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA 
deployment. As regards the dynamics of the adjustment process, we find that there are severe 
adjustment costs and stickiness towards the desired long-term level of NGA infrastructure.  
[1] 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, fiber-deployment of telecommunications access networks (“Next Generation Access” - 
NGA) has become a major issue for sector-specific regulators as well as for investing firms. Operators 
of traditional (“first generation” copper-based) telecommunications networks have to speed up their 
networks to fulfill needs for growing demand for bandwidth, arising from new/interactive multimedia 
services like streamed video on demand, High Definition Television, 3-D applications, eHealth, 
eGovernment, Web 2.0 services, etc.1  
The renewal of existing networks and their (partial) replacement by fiber optic infrastructure require 
high investment volumes.2 For this reason and because of the associated growth potential of the 
information and communication technology (ICT) industry, such a venture is even seen as a “project 
of a lifetime”.3 The future central importance of ultra-high-speed broadband infrastructure as a key 
socio-economic factor is well recognized.4 However, investments in (“second or next generation”) 
fiber-based network infrastructures vary significantly in international comparison. Whereas leading 
Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea already reached fiber coverage levels of around 35% 
by the end of 2010, other countries (“followers”, such as some Eastern European and Scandinavian 
countries) were lagging behind with coverage levels at 10 and 25%. The majority of countries 
(“starters”, including e.g. Germany) still show coverage levels of around 1%. NGA coverage in the US 
(~ 6%) is significantly above the European average level (~ 3%) by the end of 2010 (in terms of 
homes connected, see Figure A1 in the Appendix).  
Our paper represents the first European-based attempt to quantify the determinants of recent and actual 
NGA deployment. Based on an unbalanced panel of 27 European member states during the period of 
2005 to 2010, this paper addresses the following research questions: i) What is the relation between 
relevant ex ante regulation on broadband markets and the extent of NGA deployment? ii) How do 
competition and relevant demand and supply side factors in related markets influence the extent of 
NGA deployment? iii) Finally, we are interested in the dynamics and the adjustment process of NGA 
                                                     
1
  According to “Nielsen´s Law” bandwidth demand grows by 50% each year. 
2
 Total investments for a nationwide NGA deployment add up to billions of Euros (wik consult, 2008).  
3
  The subject area is yet more extensive than it might appear at first glance, because a systematic fiber-based 
roll-out is no longer just a matter of traditional telecommunications operators. Rather, public and municipal 
utilities from other network industries as energy and transport might have opportunities and incentives to 
expand their product portfolio into the telecommunications sector. 
4 
 For evidence on the positive impact of broadband deployment on employment, productivity and economic 
growth, see for instance Röller and Waverman (2001), Crandall et al. (2007) or Czernich et al. (2011). 
[2] 
deployment and the corresponding short and long run effects. It should be emphasized here that our 
focus is on NGA deployment/investment only, not on welfare.5  
Our empirical specification incorporates country level data where estimates are obtained through 
various dynamic panel methods. Applying GMM as well as LSDVC estimation techniques explicitly 
accounts for the endogeneity bias arising from the dynamic investment specification. Furthermore, we 
argue that there is no endogeneity problem with respect to investment activities and regulation in our 
case, as we relate the effectiveness of access regulation imposed years ago on the preceding broadband 
market to investment activities in an emerging (NGA) market. Any specific forms of NGA regulation 
will be defined and imposed by European regulators only in future decisions or, if already 
implemented, the effectiveness of these decisions remains to be seen.6 Methodologically, we therefore 
care about both sources of endogeneity problems which are only partly, if at all, addressed in the 
literature; for instance, Grajek and Röller (2011), who are among the few to explicitly account for 
endogeneity between investment and regulation, ignore the dynamic endogeneity bias. Multiplicity of 
methods as well as a broad set of explanatory variables and controls serve as important robustness 
checks and should take account of our small-sized data set.  
One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether NGA 
infrastructure should be subjected to sector specific regulation or not. Former – mostly state-owned – 
telecommunications monopolists (“incumbents”) argue that sector-specific ex ante regulation restricts 
their ability to generate future revenues. Accordingly, fiber roll-out could only, if at all, be done on the 
basis of deregulation of relevant markets; at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations 
(“regulatory holidays”) is deemed to be essential. Regulation of network access would, in turn, be 
detrimental to investment incentives and infrastructure innovation. Conversely, alternative operators 
who are dependent on access regulation (“service-based entrants”) as well as national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) fear the rise of another monopolistic infrastructure, if regulation is released or 
removed entirely. They argue that incumbent firms or other alternative infrastructure operators would 
gain an essential and long-lasting competitive (“first-mover”) advantage which implies the need to 
have an appropriate ex ante regulation in place. Whereas leading Asian countries take an 
interventionist and state aid driven approach, the US adopted a deregulatory and primarily market-
driven strategy which was initiated by the Federal Communications Commission´s „Brand-X 
decision“ in August 2005. The European Union (EU) framework is in between as it relies on 
                                                     
5
  However, we do think that more investment is better also from a welfare point of view. In 
telecommunications, the “Averch-Johnson” effect (too much capital employed) can be expected to be very 
small due to ex ante regulation and related service-based competition as well as intermodal infrastructure 
competition that have established for more than ten years. Moreover, we can expect huge positive 
externalities as a result of NGA investment (OECD, 2009). 
6
  In 2010, a few European countries started to introduce regulations on wholesale broadband access over NGA 
(such as Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands or Spain), on fibre unbundling (Finland and Netherlands) or 
on NGA specific capital costs (Netherlands); see Cullen International (2010, Tables 4, 9 and 10). 
[3] 
competitive market forces subject to a set of strict sector-specific regulations (see Huigen and Cave, 
2008). We cannot finally resolve this debate but, in line with related literature (see Cambini and Jiang, 
2009, for a survey and Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011, and Klumpp and Su, 2010, for recent theoretical 
treatments of the various trade-offs), our results indicate that the stricter broadband access regulation 
is, the lower is NGA infrastructure roll-out. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, we review the telecommunications related 
literature on regulation and investment in section 2. Section 3 briefly provides necessary background 
information on the technical and regulatory context of NGA. Section 4 describes basic hypotheses 
concerning investment incentives on the one hand and the scope of sector-specific regulation and 
competitive intensity on the other hand. Section 5 outlines the data basis underlying our empirical 
examination. Section 6 presents the empirical specification and related econometric issues. Section 7 
describes and interprets the main results. Section 8 summarizes and compiles most relevant aspects for 
future regulatory policy.  
2 Literature review 
Although there are a number of scientific studies that examine the impact of fixed-network regulation 
on traditional broadband or telecommunications deployment in total, there are actually no empirical 
studies which focus on the impact of regulation and competition on NGA deployment. There are, 
however, a few theoretical contributions related to NGA deployment and the involved efficiency trade-
offs, which we review first. 
Using a game-theoretic framework, Bourreau et al. (2011) analyze the incentives for incumbents and 
entrants to migrate from old technologies to NGA networks. They find that NGN investment 
incentives are affected by access regulation charges on the old copper networks via three negative 
effects: a replacement effect, a wholesale revenue effect and a business migration effect. Lowering the 
charges would reduce the wholesale revenue effect but increase the other two effects. Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2011) analyze the effects of different regulatory regimes on investment incentives and 
welfare and find that a regime of fully distributed costs or regulatory holidays is most positive for 
investment, while their simulations show that a risk-sharing approach is best from a welfare point of 
view and that long run incremental cost regulation – the EU benchmark – is least conducive to 
investment. Brito et al. (2010) address the problem of investment in NGA and two-part access tariffs 
by solving static and dynamic trade-offs. In a similar way, but not related to NGA investment, Klumpp 
and Su (2010) show that access regulation does not automatically imply that dynamic efficiency must 
be sacrificed for gains in static (allocative) efficiency. Bender and Götz (2011) model broadband 
competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm which provide broadband access in regional 
markets with different population densities. They argue that the usual trade-off between static and 
[4] 
dynamic efficiency does not apply, since higher regulated access fees increase facility-based 
competition, decrease retail prices and increase total demand. 
Early related empirical studies concentrate mostly on U.S. experience with wholesale access 
regulation, suggesting that regulated cost-based access charges would reduce investment incentives for 
incumbents and for competitive bypass (e.g. Chang, Koski and Majumdar, 2003; Ingraham and Sidak, 
2003; Crandall et al., 2004). More recent work exhibits similar results: Using data on European 
countries for the years 2002 to 2006, Waverman et al. (2007) show that the intensity of wholesale 
broadband access regulation negatively affects broadband infrastructure investment. However, the 
authors do not use any NGA specific data and their estimate on total broadband investment is derived 
from a simulation exercise. Grajek and Röller (2011) as well as Friederiszick et al. (2008) investigate 
the relationship between regulation and total investment in the telecommunications industry. These 
two studies are among the few which explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of regulation and 
investment. Investment, however, is quantified therein rather broadly by the tangible fixed assets of 
telecommunications operators and, thus, does not explicitly refer to broadband, let alone NGA 
deployment. Wallsten and Hausladen (2009), though, estimate effects of broadband access regulation 
on NGA connections within the EU. However, they only look at regulatory and income effects, but not 
at competition or any supply side variables. They use data from the EU’s Communications Committee 
for the years 2002 to 2007, which is highly fragmentary and only covers the NGA roll-out at the very 
early stage. Moreover, their dependent variable reflects the number of homes connected instead of 
homes passed which does not account for lines actually deployed but not being used, and thus does not 
reflect real investment activities. Finally, other non-US based work measures the impact of access 
regulation on broadband penetration (e.g. Wallsten, 2005, 2006; DiStaso et al., 2006). Cambini and 
Jiang (2009) survey the empirical literature and find that the majority of the studies conclude that cost-
based access regulation discourages both incumbents and alternative operators from investing in fixed 
networks.  
Summarizing, the general trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is well recognized in the 
theoretical as well as empirical literature. However, all previous empirical studies suffer from too 
broad or unsuitable measures of NGA investment to truly inform the debate on the optimal regulation 
and competition policy towards NGA infrastructure. Our work is the first that explicitly employs a 
direct measure of real and most recent NGA investment. 
3 Institutional framework 
Historically, legacy networks7 deployed twisted copper-wire pairs to overcome the last mile (“local 
loop”) to the subscriber. Originally, these networks were set up to provide narrow bandwidth voice 
telephony services (POTS/ISDN) only. Many decades later, they were made capable of supporting 
                                                     
7
 This term refers to networks already in existence, which were formerly owned by incumbent operators.  
[5] 
broadband services by means of DSL transmission technology.8 In EU member states, where sector-
specific regulation is in place, alternative operators can rent the local loop from the incumbent 
operator based on cost-oriented wholesale charges (“unbundling”). This allows alternative operators to 
use their own DSL equipment to provide (first of all) broadband services. Alternative operators may 
also offer retail broadband services by purchasing “bitstream” as a wholesale service from the 
incumbent operator. Just like unbundling, bitstream is usually associated with DSL services but at a 
more service-based level of the value chain. Finally, wholesale broadband access via simple resale 
services means that access seeking operators receive and resell a wholesale input of the incumbent 
operator without any scope of technological product differentiation, i.e., value added features only 
refer to the retail level, such as branding (see RTR, 2010, pp. 176, 179). 
However, due to technical reasons, bandwidth of DSL technologies is rather limited. In order to realize 
significantly higher bandwidth, it is necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by 
placing the DSL transmission equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the cabinets 
which house distribution frames. Deployment of DSL transmission systems in such a cabinet and 
connection to the fiber-based backbone network is referred to as “fiber to the curb/cabinet” (FTTC). In 
the remaining copper-wire line of the last mile, VDSL is used as the latest DSL transmission 
technology. This solution can provide bandwidths of approximately 20 Mbit/s to 50 Mbit/s. Even 
higher bandwidths (above 100 Mbit/s) can be achieved if the final copper-wire line is shortened 
further. Fiber to the building (FTTB) is an implementation scenario in which the optical fiber is 
extended to or into the building. Only the remaining wiring inside the building relies on conventional 
copper-wires. In cases where technical or economic considerations render it feasible to renew or 
replace in-house wiring, it is possible to eliminate copper lines entirely. In such a scenario, the optical 
line is directly connected to the individual apartment or home (“fiber to the home” - FTTH). From a 
technical point of view, this form of implementation would be the ideal solution, as it would enable a 
large number of future services with nearly unlimited bandwidth. Therefore, FTTH can be regarded as 
the most future-proof technological solution (see RTR, 2010, pp. 189-191).  
In addition to the conventional copper-wire networks, the roll-out of high-speed communications 
networks might also be realized via cable television networks (based on hybrid-fiber coaxial cable) 
and mobile networks. The latest cable transmission technology already allowed for bandwidths of 
approximately 150 Mbit/s. The mobile communications industry expects the future deployment of 
Long Term Evolution (LTE)9 technology to be able to offer data transmission rates in the same range. 
                                                     
8
 Digital Subscriber Line is a family of technologies (xDSL) that provides digital data transmission over the 
wires of a local telephone network. The data throughput typically ranges from 256 KB/s to 50 Mbit/s in the 
direction to the customer (downstream), depending on DSL technology, condition and length of the local 
loop, and service-level implementation.  
9
 Mobile broadband access is already facilitated by the previous mobile technologies GPRS, EDGE, UMTS 
und HSDPA. Currently, LTE is in the test phase in a number of countries, mainly in urban areas. 
[6] 
Although both last mentioned technologies heavily rely on fiber in their backbone networks, only 
coaxial cable is of current relevance as a substitute NGA technology. 
Since access networks branch out in a tree-like structure as they approach the final consumer, 
renewing access infrastructure involves fewer customers as one gets closer to the final consumer and 
higher average cost per customer. Investment in the access network therefore heavily depends on 
”economies of density”, that is, a high density of customers will bring about lower average costs.10 
Finally, the different scenarios of fibre deployment will come along with varying degrees of sunk and 
adjustment costs: Compared to duct costs and fiberglass, digging costs are of major importance (60-
80% of total costs) and are largely and literally sunk in nature (ERG, 2007, pp. 16-17). Also, roll-out 
of a new infrastructure is rather time-consuming as it involves complex technical network planning, 
and legal issues (such as rights of way and other allowances) have to be resolved beforehand. 
4 Hypotheses 
This section identifies determinants for previous NGA deployment in Europe (EU27) and sets out 
corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned to the research questions outlined in the introduction.  
4.1 Regulation  
As regards NGA development, investing firms are confronted with significant capital outlays as well 
as great uncertainty and high risks which affect investment decisions negatively. This is due to the 
high degree of sunk investment, long amortization periods (20-25 years) of network infrastructure,11 
the technical risk of the new technology and the economic risk of unknown demand for new services 
against the backdrop of consistently decreasing prices. Ideally, in the future design of optimal 
regulation, NRAs would take these risk factors into account in a way which simultaneously promotes 
static and dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare.12  
Regulatory intervention may influence investment incentives in several ways. In the EU, regulated 
wholesale broadband access prices are usually based on diverse cost-oriented standards, where firm 
risk is included and measured by the NRA within the scope of the firm´s capital costs (see Cullen 
International, 2010, Tables 10, 15-16). On the one hand, we have to consider the direct effect of access 
regulation on infrastructure operators. Tight regulation of existing broadband access products will 
most likely create corresponding expectations about future regulation of NGA access products and 
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  The extensive study of wik consult (2008) gives a good insight into this topic. 
11
  Incumbent operators owning legacy networks are confronted with a largely depreciated infrastructure. From 
this situation, the costs of second generation networks are not sunk before the investment decision is actually 
made. However, foreseen sunk costs will delay or make any future investment even unprofitable (see Cave 
and Martin 2010, p. 1). 
12
 The need to compensate for increased risk was explicitly mentioned by the European Commission (2009, 
Art. 3, p. 9, Art. 22, p. 13 and Annex I, pp. 17-20). 
[7] 
thus stricter access regulation will reduce investment activities since i) imposing cost-oriented prices 
for bottleneck inputs will typically reduce profits or preclude excess profits of the regulated firm 
which results in an asymmetric distribution of expected profits and therefore in a lower net present 
value of investment projects (Valetti, 2003). Furthermore, regulated infrastructure operators criticize 
that ii) access regulation ignores opportunity costs of real options13 (Guthrie, 2006) and that iii) risks 
were distributed asymmetrically as service-based operators benefit at the same time from a risk-free 
option due to mandatory access obligations imposed on the incumbent operator (Pindyck, 2007).  
Moreover, risks associated with legacy networks were deemed to be not much different from the 
overall company risk. Thus, the total risk resulting from NGA investment has not been appropriately 
considered to an NGA specific extent so far. Furthermore, pending decisions on future design of ex 
ante regulation of NGA access already lead to considerable regulatory uncertainty. As already 
mentioned, according to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), a regime of fully distributed costs or regulatory 
holidays would have the most positive effect on investment, whereas the current cost-standard, based 
on long run incremental costs, turns out to be inferior. 
On the other hand, the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications tried to resolve the 
trade-offs on the subject of dynamic and static efficiency with reference to the so called “ladder of 
investment” (Cave and Vogelsang 2003; Cave 2006). According to this hypothesis, NRAs should 
initially encourage alternative operators to engage progressively in backward integration after having 
entered the market as simple resellers on the basis of cost-oriented charges. With respect to wholesale 
broadband access, resale and bitstream should have facilitated quick and easy market entry during the 
first stage of liberalization, followed by an increasing migration towards unbundling and ultimately 
self-deployed infrastructure investment. The latter would constitute the highest rung of the ladder 
where alternative operators were fully integrated and did not depend any longer on ex ante access 
obligations. Thus, at the bottom of this principle, there is the vision of a continuous transition path 
from monopoly towards self-sustaining competition, with ex ante regulation being only a necessary 
intermediate phase. The dynamics of the transition can be influenced by NRAs via availability of 
access instruments and the level of access charges during the liberalization process. However, previous 
forms of wholesale broadband regulation based on unbundling, bitstream access and resale obligations 
were related to legacy networks and, thus, have only provided rather indirectly effective instruments 
for alternative operators. Moreover, there has been hardly any convincing empirical support for the 
ladder of investment concept so far (Waverman et al., 2007, p. 7; Friederiszick et al. 2008, p. 8). In 
reference to past market outcomes, we did not observe such a continuous development for fixed-link 
network services. Especially, due to the natural monopoly characteristics of the last mile, reaching the 
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 These include for example the risk of bypass investments of alternative service-based providers and/or the 
corresponding decrease in demand. If the value of real options is not included in the access price, this leads 
to a distortion to the disadvantage of infrastructure operators. 
[8] 
goal of infrastructure-based competition (last rung of the ladder) was largely forestalled.14 The 
dynamic concept of transition from service-based towards infrastructure-based competition becomes 
even more unlikely against the backdrop of NGA deployment, as economic replicability is even 
lower.15  
Summarizing, we do not expect a positive dynamic and indirect impact of broadband regulation on 
NGA deployment via service-based competition as idealized by the ladder of investment hypothesis. 
Also, the direct impact of access regulation on infrastructure-based operators is likely to be negative 
and, therefore, the stricter access regulation is, the lower will be NGA infrastructure investment. 
4.2 Competition 
Basically, the following relevant competition effects can be identified: First, a “business migration 
effect” (Bourreau et al., 2011) appears at the retail level, because NGA investments would 
“cannibalise” quasi-monopolistic profits from preceding broadband services and thus reduces 
profitability and the incentive to invest. With higher levels of competition, this replacement effect 
becomes less important as economic rents will be eliminated.16 Second, competitive markets bear 
incentives for innovation by giving the innovator the chance to jump ahead of rivals and earn 
temporary market power rents. This so-called “escape competition effect” will lead to a positive 
relation between competition and investment, if there is a reasonable threat of another firm investing 
in capturing these rents. However, a state close to perfect competition will eventually reduce potential 
rents and, thus, increasingly counteract investment because operators are not able to generate 
necessary profits from innovation. This appropriability effect can, third, be referred to as 
“Schumpeterian”. Indeed, Aghion et al. (2005) showed that in view of these multiple effects an 
inverted U-shaped relationship is to be expected with respect to investment and competitive intensity. 
In the context of NGA deployment, one might expect a non-linear relation for a similar line of 
reasoning. Telecommunications, by all means, has become one of the most dynamic industries after 
the electronic communications markets have been liberalized. Likewise, recent and future investment 
in NGA is driven by competitive pressure, most notably, from cable and mobile networks, which 
”threaten” copper-wire networks as regards new broadband services. At the same time, well-
                                                     
14
  With respect to traditional broadband services, empirical evidence (Höffler, 2007) suggests that broadband 
deployment was predominantly triggered by infrastructure-based competition with service-based 
competition relying on regulated DSL-services playing a secondary role. 
15
 See the discussion on replicability in Section 2. Also, it is unlikely that service-based entrants will initiate a 
“race” to update infrastructure as suggested in the context of pre-emption strategies (e.g. Gans, 2001). 
16
  Considering regulated broadband access services, there might be also a replacement effect at the wholesale 
level at work: The tighter, i.e., the stricter wholesale access for the incumbent´s DSL products is regulated, 
the lower will be profits and the replacement effect. However, expectations about future regulation of NGA 
products would again counteract that wholesale replacement effect. We will combine these effects at the 
wholesale and retail level and refer to them as “total replacement effect”. See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a 
more general description of the replacement effects in the communications industry. 
[9] 
established infrastructure-based competition can counteract investment in NGA by making NGA 
projects riskier with lower expected profits or even loss-making. As Bauer (2010, p. 69) concludes, the 
actual pattern is still to be explored: “[t]he empirical shape of this relation for the next generation 
network […] is not known and will only be revealed over time.”  
Summarizing, due to the existence of these opposing effects, we expect a non-linear relationship 
between the intensity of infrastructure-based retail competition and NGA investment.  
4.3 Dynamic, demand and supply side factors 
The level as well as the speed of NGA deployment will also be influenced by variables related to 
consumer demand and (adjustment) costs of the infrastructure roll-out.  
Costs will crucially depend on population or household density and topographic characteristics. Civil 
engineering and construction costs (including in-house wiring) represent by far the most relevant cost 
drivers for NGA deployment. Furthermore, costs will be determined by a variety of institutional 
factors such as rights of way or other allowances and technical standards and specifications which are 
partly still an open issue. Therefore, it is likely that adjustment to desired infrastructure investment 
levels will take place only gradually over time.  
Demand and willingness to pay will depend on the overall market size in terms of relevant 
telecommunications and ICT expenditures and consumer wealth in general. Whereas traditional voice 
telephony exhibits fairly stable demand, demand for high-speed broadband services is much more 
uncertain and seems to have more luxury characteristics (Muselaers and Stil 2010, p. 6). Finally, 
demand for access to NGA services and usage intensity will also be driven by the quality and the 
degree of innovation of NGA based broadband services.  
5 Data and variables 
We use the following data sources: The “Progress Report on the Single European Electronic 
Communications Market” (sequentially referred to as the “EU Progress Report”) provides yearly data 
on all the relevant regulatory variables on wholesale broadband access as well as cable and DSL 
related data for our competition variables for the period of 2005-2009.17 Our second main source is the 
database of FTTH Council Europe,18 which includes bi-annual numbers of deployed NGA lines for all 
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  Source: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.-
htm and http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/scoreboard/library/index_en.htm. 
18
  FTTH Council Europe is a non-profit industry organisation, whose aim is to enforce deployment of fibre 
optic technology in Europe. Their data are collected by IDATE through desk research, direct contacts with 
FTTx players, information exchange with FTTH Council Europe members and from IDATE partners and are 
available to all members of the organization. 
[10] 
EU27 member states for the period of 2006-2010.19 EUROSTAT20 provides data on ICT expenditures 
and labor costs. We also use the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) “World 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database“21 for survey data on the percentage of population using 
mobile internet services via 3G and the percentage of heavy internet users. Finally, World Bank's 
“World Development Indicators”22 and the “World Economic Outlook” of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)23 provide us with the percentage of people living in urban areas and GDP per capita. As 
data availability varies by variable, we use an unbalanced panel data set of EU27 member states for 
the time range of 2005-2009 for yearly data provided by the EU Progress Report, EUROSTAT, ITU, 
World Bank and IMF and 2006-2010 for the data provided by the FTTH Council Europe. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.24 
5.1 Dependent variable 
In line with the technical description in section 2, our dependent variable represents the number of 
homes passed by FTTx25 in per capita terms and, thus, real investment in physical units. The term 
“homes passed” refers to the number of households that have access via FTTx, but need not have a 
corresponding retail contract. The number of homes passed therefore significantly differs from the 
number of homes connected, which is the amount of households exhibiting sufficient willingness to 
pay and actively using one of the FTTx-technologies. Our dependent variable directly reflects the 
existing NGA infrastructure stock which we consider the most suitable proxy for both empirical as 
well as conceptual reasons.26  
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 Source: http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6.  
20
  Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database. 
21
  Source: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/world/world.html. 
22
  Source: http://data.worldbank.org. 
23
  Source: http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28. 
24
  Less than 1% of our data had to be created by using linear interpolation. Results are virtually the same if we 
use the raw data. 
25 
 This includes FTTH/B, Fibre to the curb, VDSL, VDSL2, Fibre to the last amplifier (cable and FTTx/LAN). 
Full definition available at: http://s.ftthcouncil.org/files/FTTH-Definitions-Revision_January_2009_0.pdf. 
26
  For instance, using the firm level investment to capital stock ratio on the left hand side, as seen in the 
literature, would not provide us with NGA specific investment activities which we are interested in, but 
typically with investment in a broad mixture of telecommunications segments such as backbone, traditional 
wireline, broadband or even wireless networks. Conceptually, we argue that any normative objectives 
concerning the socially optimal infrastructure stock are much more likely formulated in real terms 
(percentage of population/households to be reached) as opposed to a certain monetary investment amount; 
see, for instance, the guidelines of the European Commission (2010, section 2.4) on the “digital agenda”.  
[11] 
5.2 Independent variables 
We can divide the explanatory variables into the following three categories: regulation, competition 
and control variables, with the latter focusing on demand and cost shifters. All variables and their 
sources are listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Our regulation variable, ms_reg, reflects the percentage use of total regulated wholesale broadband 
lines (including unbundling, bitstream and resale) related to total retail broadband lines. Therefore, this 
variable not only includes all relevant instruments of wholesale broadband regulation as outlined in 
section 2, it also provides a direct measure for their effectiveness at the same time by counting the 
percentage of lines actively used by service-based competitors.27 Furthermore, as outlined in section 1, 
it can be argued that the effectiveness of regulation of the “old” network infrastructure, ms_reg, is 
exogenous with respect to the “new” infrastructure. We expect a negative sign on ms_reg, since tight 
access regulation of existing broadband services creates corresponding expectations on future NGA 
access regulation on the part of infrastructure operators. Also, the ladder of investment hypothesis is 
unlikely to become effective in terms of inducing service-based operators to engage in NGA 
infrastructure investment activities.  
Competition is measured in two ways which account for the two main forms of infrastructure-based 
competition: ms_cable is the ratio of cable connections provided by entrant cable operators in the 
fixed broadband market to the total number of cable connections plus fixed DSL lines provided by 
both, incumbents and entrants. The second competition variable, iu3g, states the percentage of people 
using 3G technologies (such as UMTS and HSDPA) to access the internet. These variables measure 
the competitive pressure stemming from fixed and mobile broadband services. The overall effect of 
these competition variables is ambiguous due to the opposing “Schumpeterian” and “escape 
competiton” effects. Thus, we expect a non-linear, inverted-U-shaped relationship with respect to 
ms_cable and iu3g.  
Finally, dsl_share, the percentage of DSL lines run by the incumbent to total broadband lines, directly 
measures to what extent fixed broadband competition is based on the incumbent´s conventional xDSL 
technology. As outlined in section 4.2, the effect of this variable is ambiguous as well.  
Demand and cost shifters are included as control variables. GDP per capita, GDP_pc, captures 
income effects throughout our country set. Information technologies expenditures, ict_exp, act as a 
proxy for the market size of the ICT industry and thus for the overall willingness to pay for broadband 
                                                     
27
  As a consequence, we do not have to rely on broadly defined indices, dummy-based scorecards or other 
proxies which are commonly used in related literature but are hardly related to fixed broadband wholesale 
access regulations (such as the OECD regulatory index for the telecom sector). Grajek and Röller (2011) use 
Plaut´s regulatory index which explicitly covers broadband regulations, though, but it is available only until 
2006. Moreover, that index does not consider the substantial differences as regards the actual importance of 
the individual broadband access regulations.  
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services in a country. Furthermore, we include the variable iday which provides the share of 
population that uses the internet frequently.  
The share of a country´s urban population, ratio_urban, reflects different cost structures due to 
varying shares of rural and densely populated areas. The variable lab_cost gives an annual labor cost 
index normalized to 100 in 2005 and should serve as another cost proxy for infrastructure roll-out.  
Finally, we include country fixed effects controlling for time invariant and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Most notably, NGA relevant and country specific differences might be related to certain cost 
conditions such as rights of way, regulations on digging, local availability of ducts and dark fiber, 
different levels of (regulated) capital costs or topographic and demographic characteristics. Demand 
and supply will also be influenced by state aid policies which show hardly any variation with regard to 
the time frame of our data set. 
6 Empirical specification 
6.1 The model 
In our baseline model, the log of homes passed by FTTx normalized to population is our dependent 
variable. We use a dynamic approach to incorporate investment and deployment patterns appropriately. 
As the literature (e.g. Friederisczek et al. 2008; Cambini and Rondi 2010; Greenstein et al. 1995) 
suggests, sufficient static models are not appropriate, as these would only account for effects that have 
an immediate impact on the infrastructure stock. Rather, one wants to differentiate between long-run 
and short-run effects. Therefore, we use a partial adjustment approach as our econometric model, as 
firms are most likely not able to adjust their infrastructure stock to prevalent market conditions within 
one period. Thus, shocks today not only affect the current infrastructure stock, but also the stock in 
future periods, where the adjustment to a long-run optimal infrastructure stock is only gradual over 
time. This target per capita infrastructure stock is given by 
(1) ∗ =  	
′ +   +  , 
where ∗  reflects the long-run optimal infrastructure stock for country i at time t, 	 is a matrix of 
explanatory variables, the  are the country-specific fixed effects and  is an error term assumed to 
be i.i.d. We assume that the change in infrastructure stock follows a partial adjustment process which 
reads 
(2)  − , =   ′∗ −  , +  . 
Every period,   ′ percent of the gap between the desired and actual infrastructure stock level is closed, 
with   ′ being the speed of adjustment, and 0 <   ′ < 1. Substituting (1) in (2) yields the empirically 
testable equation 
[13] 
(3)  =  , +  	
 +  ′ +   , 
where  =   ′ +   and  = 1 −   ′, 
 =   ′
′. Short-run effects are given by 
 and estimates 
of 
′ (=  
′
 ) reflect the long-run effects of the 	 on the desired infrastructure stock.  
In our empirical baseline specification, equation (4), we use lagged explanatory variables, because 
usually firms need some time to react to changing market or regulatory policy conditions:28 
(4) , =  
 +  , + 
_ !", + 
#_$%&'!, +  
(_$%&'!,# +
 
)*3", + 
,*3",
# +  
- *.%/, + 
0".1_1$, +  
2*$_!1, +
 
3 &%4_151, + 
.'_ℎ% !, +   +  7 +  , 
where  is the actual number of homes passed per capita in country i at time t which is related to 
our set of independent variables. The  and 7  are country-specific and time-specific fixed effects, 
respectively, and  are the error terms assumed to be i.i.d.  
6.2 Econometric issues 
Using panel data allows us to take into account both, unobserved (country) heterogeneity and the 
dynamics of investment behaviour. However, estimating equation (4) by means of a fixed-effect 
(within or LSDV) estimator would yield inconsistent and biased results, since the lagged dependent 
variable and the fixed effects error terms would be correlated (Nickell, 1981). Bruno (2005) developed 
a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) for unbalanced panel data, which can be used if there is no 
endogeneity problem. Other methods are the general method of moments difference estimator (GMM-
DIF) developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the general method of moments system estimator 
(GMM-SYS). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show by Monte Carlo 
analysis that their GMM-SYS estimator, using a system of first-differenced and levels equations, has a 
smaller bias than GMM-DIF for finite samples. In order to account for a potential unit root problem, 
we took the logarithm of the left hand side and the lagged dependent variables.  
Related literature (e.g. Grajek and Röller 2011) suggests that reverse causality between regulation and 
investment has to be expected in general, as NRAs are likely to react to firm's previous investment 
decisions and the corresponding infrastructure stock today. However, in this paper we do not look at 
the impact of NGA regulation on NGA investment, but on the impact of previous regulation of 
(conventional) broadband services (based on DSL) on NGA investment. The usual objection that 
investment in one market influences the regulation of the same market, is thus not valid in our case. 
Indeed, one can hardly imagine that the current NGA deployment influences previous regulation on 
broadband markets which has been implemented by NRAs typically many years ago. At the same 
                                                     
28
  Therefore, we can assume that investment made at particular points in time is dependent on last year’s 
conditions and it makes good sense to use a data set, where the right hand side variables are lagged once 
compared to the dependent variable. 
[14] 
time, previous regulation on broadband markets is a rather reasonable proxy for expected NGA 
regulation, inasmuch as it represents the most related remedial measures within the sector-specific EU 
framework for electronic communications markets. Furthermore, by lagging the explanatory variables, 
we relate NGA deployment to the effectiveness of previous broadband regulations. This should already 
eliminate any endogeneity problem. In order to underline this argument, however, we will perform 
Granger causality tests (see for instance, Cambini and Rondi, 2011). 
7 Discussion of main results 
The main results are reported in Table 1. Regressions (1)-(4) show estimation results of GMM-DIFF, 
GMM-SYS, LSDVC and Fixed Effects (FE) models. Our GMM models employ t-2 and t-3 lags of the 
dependent variable as internal instruments. Endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be 
valid instruments provided that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
idiosyncratic error terms.29 The Sargan test does not suggest rejection of the over-identifying 
restrictions at conventional levels. The AR(1) as well as the AR(2) test statistics reveal absence of first 
and second order serial correlation in the first differenced errors. Both, GMM estimations as well as 
LSDVC, deal with the dynamic panel bias which is due to the lagged dependent variable on the right 
hand side of equation (4). Direct comparison with FE results shows that this kind of dynamic bias 
seems to matter substantially throughout our baseline model specification.30  
Our results show a significantly negative coefficient on our regulatory variable (ms_regt-1) throughout 
all model estimations in Table 1 (regressions (1)-(4)). This strongly supports our hypothesis outlined in 
section 4.1, that stricter previous ex ante regulation lead to a negative impact on NGA infrastructure 
investment. Hence, it appears that the expectations on future NGA related regulation clearly outweigh 
potential dynamic efficiency gains via service-based competition as stipulated by the ladder of 
investment hypothesis.31  
In order to examine our presumption on the exogeneity of our regulatory variable (ms_regt-1), we carry 
out Granger causality tests using GMM-SYS and LSDVC which are reported in Table A4 and in Table 
                                                     
29
  Due to the possible problem of too many instruments we restrict the number of lags used as instruments at a 
maximum of two. 
30
  In contrast, Grajek and Röller (2011) “found little difference” between LSDV and LSDVC estimates and 
thus concluded that the dynamic bias can be ignored. Indeed, it seems to be quite obvious that using a 
broadly defined measure of investment (fixed tangible assets) implies much less stickiness and adjustment 
costs compared with a direct measure of real NGA investment. 
31
  When including the squared term of ms_reg, both, ms_reg as well as ms_reg2 appear to be insignificant. This 
indicates that ms_reg reflects expectations about regulatory policies rather than effectiveness of service-
based competition, where, similarly to cable and mobile competition, a non-linear relationship could be 
expected in advance. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
[15] 
A5 in the Appendix. The results obtained therein do not give any indication of a reversed causality 
pattern between NGA deployment and broadband regulation or competition.  
The magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates inherent inertia due to 
adjustment costs. This seems to be quite plausible with respect to diverse technological and economic 
impediments underlying the deployment of new infrastructure. As derived in section 6.1, the speed of 
adjustment is given by one minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Thus, our results 
suggest that around 40% of the gap to the desired infrastructure stock is closed in every period. 
Therefore, a shock today, e.g. a change in regulatory policy, has a long-lasting effect on the 
development of the infrastructure stock.  
Our partial adjustment model allows us to disentangle short and long-run effects according to the 
model framework in section 6.1. With  ′ ≅ 0.39 for GMM-SYS and GMM-DIFF, the respective long-
run coefficient (
′ (=  
′
 )) of each explanatory variable rises significantly which indicates substantial 
long-run economic effects. As regards the dynamics of the adjustment process, it would take around 
4.6 years for the average European country to close 90% of the gap to the desired long-run 
infrastructure stock. The EU average desired infrastructure stock for FTTx is given by 21,2% of the 
population. It is interesting to contrast these numbers with the policy goals of the European 
Commission´s digital agenda. According to this guideline (i) all Europeans should have access to 
internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households should subscribe to 
internet connections above 100 Mbps by 2020 (European Commission, 2010, p. 19). Whereas this 
agenda seems to be realistic in terms of the scheduled time frame, it turns out to be rather optimistic 
with reference to the desired level of NGA infrastructure under current investment conditions. 
As regards our infrastructure-based competition variables (ms_cablet-1; ms_cable2t-1; iu3gt-1; iu3g2t-1), 
all estimation models show a non-linear relationship between cable as well as mobile competition 
variables and investment. The variables are significant in GMM and partially significant in LSDVC 
estimations. Broadband services of cable operators already exceed quality characteristics (such as 
bandwidth) of incumbents´ DSL or FTTC services at similar price levels. Mobile broadband 
technologies, in contrast, constitute a more complementary form of broadband access for narrow-
bandwidth users and specific broadband services and, thus, have exerted much less competitive 
pressure in the past.  
The maximum of the inverted U-shaped curve, showing the relationship between investment and 
competition, informs us about the optimal competitive market conditions for investment. For instance, 
one can infer from the corresponding coefficient estimates of our GMM-SYS model (regression (2)) 
that a market share of cable entrants and a mobile internet usage rate of around 22% and 9%,32 
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  Respective values for regressions (1) and (3) are quite similar: GMM-DIFF: 19.3% (cable) and 9.1% 
(mobile); LSDVC: 16.5% (cable) and 6.4% (mobile). 
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respectively, are optimal for NGA investment. The average market share of cable entrants is 24.7 % in 
our data set and, thus, lies already above this optimum value for NGA investment. Contrary, the 
average penetration rate of mobile internet is 3.6% and thus well below the 9% threshold.33 Therefore, 
in line with the remarks in sections 3 and 4.2, the Schumpeterian seems to outweigh the escape 
competition effect with respect to cable competition, while for mobile competition it is the other way 
round.  
Our results indicate that, for example, in France, the country with the lowest cable penetration in 2010, 
an increase of cable penetration from 5,6% to the optimal level of 22% would lead to a mean increase 
of FTTx coverage of 21,6%. For a country like Hungary with cable penetration rates above this 
optimum level (43,3%), a further increase in cable competition of ten percentage points would reduce 
optimal FTTx coverage by 64%. Similarly, for a country like Romania, with a share of the population 
using high speed mobile services of as low as 0,6% in 2010, a rise up to the European mean of 3,6% 
would result in a mean increase of FTTX coverage of 22%.  
With respect to the “total replacement effect”, we could not find any significant evidence in our 
sample concerning the traditional broadband DSL services. Individual coefficients of the respective 
variable (dsl_sharet-1), which basically capture the incumbent´s DSL products at the wholesale and 
retail level, are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.  
Table A3 shows the results for a model containing also GDP (gdp_pct-1), and internet usage (idayt-1) as 
further control variables. The coefficients of these variables are insignificant throughout our 
estimations and are therefore not included in the final results of Table 1. Comparing Table 1 with Table 
A3 reveals that the major results as regards regulation and competition are quite similar. 
In line with our hypotheses in section 4.3, we find a significant positive impact of our demand variable 
(ict_expt-1) which captures willingness to pay for broadband services, using GMM estimation methods. 
However, the cost variable (e.g. urban_popt-1) appears to be insignificant throughout all models. This 
might be attributed to the fact that country specific effects already take into account most of the 
explanatory power of this variable. Indeed, many NGA specific cost factors seem to be highly 
dependent on national circumstances and hardly vary across time (Neumann 2010, p. 6). Similarly, 
local labor costs (lab_cost)34 do not exhibit substantial variation over our short time horizon which 
resulted in insignificant estimation coefficients.35 Our presumption that fixed effects are largely driven 
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  Of course, more intense competition could lead to more static efficiency and the optimum with respect to 
total welfare is unclear. 
34
  Introducing lab_cost as a further cost proxy basically leaves the structure and significance of the main 
variables of interest unchanged. However, consideration of lab_cost would have brought about a significant 
reduction in the number of observations and thus further insignificancies. For this reason we decided to drop 
lab_cost from Table A3. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
35
  Likewise, interest rates are fixed across most sample units (EU27 member states) and those show 
insufficient variation for estimation purposes. 
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by diverse cost factors gets reasserted as fixed effects estimates turn out to be highly negative 
throughout all observation units. 
Table 1: Determinants of NGA investment (final model)  
Dependent 
variable: log fttx 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GMM DIFF GMM SYS LSDVC FE 
log fttx(t-1) 0.610*** 0.606*** 0.576*** 0.420*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ms_reg(t-1) -0.037** -0.040* -0.038* -0.038** 
 (0.042) (0.083) (0.074) (0.040) 
ms_cable(t-1) 0.452*** 0.557*** 0.280* 0.196 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.055) (0.140) 
ms_cable(t-1)2 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.032) 
iu3g(t-1) 0.304** 0.288* 0.066 0.218 
 (0.019) (0.052) (0.735) (0.142) 
iu3g(t-1)2 -0.017** -0.016* -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.025) (0.063) (0.700) (0.188) 
ict_exp(t-1) 1.419* 1.808** 1.484 1.825 
 (0.073) (0.018) (0.129) (0.105) 
urban_pop(t-1) -0.150 0.056 0.586 0.491 
 (0.783) (0.319) (0.261) (0.118) 
Constant 4.470 -12.310**  -38.550* 
 (0.907) (0.032)  (0.070) 
AR(1) test p-value 0.651 0.597   
AR(2) test p-value 0.849 0.876   
Sargan-test p-value 0.949 0.827   
Wald(X2)-test 93.08*** 159.98***   
R-squared within    0.712 
Number of 
observations 52 76 76 76 
Regressions (1)-(4) include country-specific fixed effects which are not reported for brevity. We did not include 
year dummies, because they were not significant, neither jointly, nor individually. For the Arellano-Bond (AR(1) 
and AR(2)) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, corresponding p-values are reported. 
P-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity and to within 
group serial correlation in GMM estimates. LSDVC standard errors are bootstrapped based on 300 iterations 
with bias correction for estimates up to order o(1/NT2); * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
[18] 
8 Conclusions and final remarks 
In this paper, we determine the effects of regulation and competition on the infrastructure roll-out of 
next generation access networks in Europe. In doing this, we used a panel data set of EU27 member 
states on NGA investment as well as the main competition and regulatory variables. As opposed to 
previous related literature, our econometric specification does neither suffer from the dynamic panel 
bias nor from an endogeneity problem with respect to investment and regulation.  
Our results indicate that previous NGA deployment is determined by the extent of infrastructure-based 
competition stemming from cable operators and mobile networks. Whereas the effect of competition 
corresponds to the inverted U-shaped hypothesis, stricter previous sector-specific broadband 
regulation has negatively affected NGA deployment, which largely accompanies with the empirical 
literature cited in section 2.  
Although our work only provides preliminary conclusions, as NGA specific data are limited so far, 
these conclusions are of significant relevance for future regulatory decisions, as the setting of the 
regulatory agenda for network investment and innovation is currently to be implemented and specified 
by NRAs across most EU member states.36 Considering sector-specific regulation, our results reaffirm 
recent US regulation adopting a deregulatory approach of broadband markets in 2005 and, since then, 
experiencing significantly higher NGA deployment levels and annual growth rates compared with the 
EU average (see Figure A1). 
There are essentially two ways to achieve a fast and comprehensive NGA roll-out. First, market-based 
incentives, including US-like regulation strategies as, for example, regulatory holidays, are possible. 
Second, direct state subsidies as seen in many Asian countries and, more recently, in Australia and 
New Zealand, will be needed, especially to supply white areas with next generation networks. 
According to our results, applying neither of these and neglecting inherent trade-offs between static 
and dynamic efficiency as the EU suggests in their sector-specific regulatory framework, would not 
allow to achieve the ambitious goals. 
If a quick deployment of NGA infrastructure is deemed to be of socio-economic importance, 
upcoming sector-specific regulation should thus be more accentuated towards investment incentives 
and reduce regulatory risk for infrastructure operators. As the “ladder of investment” hypothesis seems 
to be rather unlikely to hold in view of the economics of NGA networks, infrastructure-based 
competition should be at the heart of this regulatory process.  
  
                                                     
36
  The reader is referred to the recent NGA related consultations of the European Commission on “costing 
methodologies for key wholesale access prices” and on “non-discrimination”; consultation documents 
(launched 3rd October 2011) are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/-
library/public_consult/cost_accounting/index_en.htm. 
[19] 
Appendix 
 
Figure A1: FTTH/B coverage in international comparison (“homes connected”) 
 
Figure A1 based on data by IDATE and FTTH Council Europe (2011). Some countries (such as Slovenia) 
already reached saturation, whereas other “followers” (such as Sweden and Lithuania) are still rapidly growing 
up to 2010. Japan and South Korea (“leaders”) are still far beyond, especially when compared to the average 
level of the EU27 and the USA. Since there is a lack of data on FTTC for Asian countries, FTTH/B is used here 
instead of FTTH/B/C for comparison (for the technical definitions the reader is referred to section 3 and 5.1).  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
fttx 127 .0623 .091 0 .523 
log(fttx) 111 -4.199 2.552 -10.539 -0.648 
ms_reg 156 19.486 18.592 0 97.1 
ms_cab 154 24.661 16.051 0 82.792 
iu3g 132 3.592 3.867 0 20.4 
dsl_share 158 66.628 20.568 7.257 99.585 
iday 161 40.504 16.918 6.2 76.4 
gdp_pc 162 30980.09 20829.53 3743.413 3743.413 
ict_exp 101 2.047 .766 0 4.2 
urban_pop 131 69.475 15.564 15.99 97.759 
lab_cost 129 107.558 11.886 80.04 150.27 
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Table A2: Variable description 
Variable Description Source 
FTTx Homes 
passed/population, 
Fttx 
Number of households with access to 
FTTx normalized to population FTTH Council Europe 
Effectivity of wholesale 
broadband regulation, 
ms_reg 
Market share of regulated lines (local 
loop unbundling, bitstream, resale) 
related to total retail broadband lines 
EU Progress Report 
Cable broadband 
competition, 
ms_cable 
Share of cable lines run by entrants 
related to cable and DSL lines run by 
both, incumbents and entrants 
EU Progress Report 
Mobile broadband 
competition, 
iu3g 
Percentage of population using mobile 
internet services via 3G networks 
(UMTS or higher bandwidth) 
ITU 
DSL-share, 
dsl_share 
Share of incumbent DSL lines to total 
broadband lines EU Progress Report 
Heavy internet users, 
iday 
Percentage of population using internet 
services every or almost every day ITU 
GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc 
Gross domestic product per capita in 
US$ IMF 
ICT expenditures, 
ict_exp 
Percentage of expenditures on 
information technologies of GDP EUROSTAT 
Urban population, 
urban_pop 
Share of urban to total population, 
whereas urban population is defined by 
national statistical offices  
World Bank Development 
Index 
Labor costs, 
lab_cost 
Annual labor cost index (for each 
country normalized to 100 in 2005) EUROSTAT 
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Table A3: Results including GDP, DSL-share and internet use as additional control variables  
Dependent 
variable: log fttx 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GMM DIFF GMM SYS LSDVC FE 
log fttx(t-1) 0.666*** 0.720*** 0.589*** 0.377*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
ms_reg(t-1) -0.039** -0.039* -0.039* -0.036** 
 (0.026) (0.053) (0.081) (0.012) 
ms_cable(t-1) 0.437*** 0.574*** 0.247 0.125 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.134) (0.389) 
ms_cable2(t-1) -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.008** -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.105) 
iu3g(t-1) 0.317** 0.356 0.015 0.145 
 (0.032) (0.107) (0.942) (0.379) 
iu3g2(t-1) -0.018** -0.021* -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.094) (0.935) (0.412) 
dsl_share(t-1) 0.067 0.030 0.110 0.106 
 (0.346) (0.694) (0.154) (0.151) 
iday(t-1) -0.001 -0.033 0.019 0.046 
 (0.832) (0.408) (0.675) (0.407) 
gdp_pc(t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.787) (0.453) (0.952) (0.696) 
ict_exp(t-1) 1.193 1.592* 1.102 1.456 
 (0.299) (0.083) (0.419) (0.307) 
urban_pop(t-1) -0.194 0.075 0.544 0.303 
 (0.756) (0.236) (0.350) (0.488) 
Constant 4.642 -12.050  -34.120 
 (0.913) (0.119)  (0.243) 
AR(1) test p-value 0.508 0.433   
AR(2) test p-value 0.588 0.583   
Sargan test p-value 0.822 0.796   
Wald(;<)-test 227.52*** 502.31***   
R-squared within    0.733 
N 52 76 76 76 
Regressions (1)-(4) include country-specific fixed effects which are not reported for brevity. We did not include 
year dummies, because they were not significant, neither jointly, nor individually. For the Arellano-Bond (AR(1) 
and AR(2)) tests and the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions corresponding p-values are reported. 
P-values for estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity and to within 
group serial correlation in GMM estimates. LSDVC standard errors are bootstrapped based on 300 iterations 
with bias correction for estimates up to order o(1/NT2); * p < 0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
[23] 
Table A4: Granger causality tests (direction: reverse causality) – GMM-SYS 
GMM SYS (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent 
variable 
ms_reg ms_cab iu3g 
log fttx(t-1) -0.00975 -0.00162 0.00130 
 (0.460) (0.380) (0.300) 
ms_reg(t-1) 0.944***   
 (0.000)   
ms_cab(t-1)  0.635***  
  (0.000)  
iu3g(t-1)   1.273*** 
   (0.000) 
_cons 0.000 0.068** 0.015** 
 (1.000) (0.012) (0.036) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 60 60 59 
p-values in brackets, *<0.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01; one lag was used instead of two because otherwise there would 
not be a sufficient number of observations left. Results for GMM-DIFF were not computed for the same reason. 
 
 
Table A5: Granger causality tests (direction: reverse causality) – LSDVC 
LSDVC  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent 
variable 
ms_reg ms_cab iu3g 
log fttx(t-1) 0.013 0.000 0.001 
 (0.250) (0.720) (0.490) 
ms_reg(t-1) 0.489***   
 (0.009)   
ms_cab(t-1)  0.569***  
  (0.000)  
iu3g(t-1)   0.958*** 
   (0.000) 
Times dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 60 60 59 
p-values in brackets, *<0.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01  
[24] 
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